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CASE COMMENT
PATENT LAW: COMMON SENSE TESTING-A HANDS OFF
APPROACH FOR REDUCTION TO PRACTICE
Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
Michael Kruljac*
Appellant and appellee independently and concurrently invented a
patentable penile implant for men unable to obtain or maintain an
erection.1 Although appellee won the race to the patent office for filing
the patent application, appellant had the earlier conception date.'
Appellant sought to prove his invention had priority in an interference
proceeding' before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the
Board).4 To prove priority, appellant showed the Board a videotape,
filmed before appellee's filing, depicting the penile prosthesis being

* To my wife, Jill, and my parents, Carl and Katy.
1. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This proceeding was the second
time the parties locked horns; the earlier contest over related subject matter also was resolved
in the appellant's favor. Id. at 1060. The penile implant prosthesis at issue here was described
as follows:
An implantable penile prosthesis for implanting completely within a patient's penis
comprising at least one elongated member having a flexible distal forward section
for implantation within the pendulous penis, said forward section being constructed
to rigidize upon being filled with pressuring fluid; a proximal, rearward section
adapted to be implanted within the root end of the penis, said rearward section
containing a fluid reservoir chamber, externally operable pump means in said
member for transferring fluid under pressure to said flexible distal forward section
of said member for achieving an erection; and valve means positioned within said
member which open[s] when said pump is operated so that fluid is forced from
said pump through said valve means into said flexible distal forward section of said
chamber.
Id.
2. Id. A subsequent applicant, in order to establish prior invention over an earlier
applicant, must prove that conception and reduction to practice occurred before the filing of the
first application. Paivinen v. Sands, 339 F.2d 217, 222 (C.C.P.A. 1965). Reduction to practice
is accomplished when the workability of an invention is demonstrated. Eastern Rotorcraft Corp.
v. United States, 384 F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
3. An interference proceeding results when two or more patent applicants claim priority
for the same invention. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINEs 404 (rev. 3d ed. Foundation Press 1993) (1973).
4. Scott, 34 F.3d at 1060.
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surgically inserted into a patient and then being manipulated by the
surgeon to demonstrate the extent of its functionality.5 Appellant argued
that his invention deserved priority because it had been reduced to
practice prior to appellee's filing.
The Board appreciated the ingenuity and operation of the device but
decided that the videotape demonstration failed to prove reduction to
practice.7 This ruling was based on the view that only a test under
actual conditions or a close simulation would suffice; only then could
the utility of the invention be shown by proving that it could operate
effectively under its intended conditions for a reasonable length of
time.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed and HELD, whether the testing used is sufficient to show
reduction to practice may be answered by applying common sense.9
Empowered by Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution,'" Congress has enacted legislation" to further the aims
of the drafters with respect to intellectual property-to create inventions
whose benefit would inure to both the inventor and society, and to
disseminate the designs into the public domain to spur further creative

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1060-61.
8. Id. at 1061.
9. Id. at 1063-64; see also infra note 36 (explaining court's use of common sense).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This provision reads in relevant part, "The Congress
shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries ..
" Id.
11. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 364-65. Congress has been busy attending to patent
law. Id. Most notable have been patent acts passed in 1790, 1793, 1836, and 1952. Id.
Amendments and revisions to these have been numerous, particularly to the 1952 Act. Id. The
current statute pertaining to conditions of patentability reads:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining
priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a
time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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ingenuity.12 Congress anticipated the problems which would arise when
different inventors made patent claims to the same invention. 3 Thus,
in such a contest, the party which showed an earlier reduction to
practice of the invention, regardless of differing filing dates, would be
awarded the patent. 4 This requirement did not entirely solve the
problem, however, as courts struggled to determine whether a given test.
was adequate to show that an invention had been reduced to practice. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit first enunciated a methodical approach to the adequacy-of-test
problem in Sydeman v. Thoma 6 by categorizing inventions into three
classes, each requiring a different level of testing. 7 The first class
comprised devices so simple and obviously effective that their mere
construction met the reduction-to-practice requirement. The second
class consisted of inventions which were not mechanically perfect, but
which had test results that were good enough to amount to a reduction
to practice because the intended purpose was reasonably satisfied. 9
Therefore, an inventor could substitute better materials for use in
commercial models that were not used at the time of testing. ° The
third class included devices requiring special consideration of the
particular use intended, such that actual use of the device for its
intended purpose was necessary.2? ' Mere consideration of form or test
results was insufficient.22
In Sydeman, the court was faced with resolving an interference case
involving the invention of a machine designed to apply an adhesive
material to cloth.23 The appellants argued that they were entitled to
priority because experimentation of the apparatus constituted a reduction
to practice.24 The court concluded that appellants' invention was in the

12. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10-11.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988) (assigning priority among competing inventors). For
the text of § 102(g), see supra note 11.
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988); supra note 2.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 24-38.
16. 32 App. D.C. 362 (D.C. Cir. 1909).
17. Id. at 373-74,
18. Id. at 373.
19. Id. at 373-74.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 374.
22. See id.

23. Id. at 364. The cloth used was duck, a plain cloth made of cotton that is used in items
like sails, bags, belts, tents, awnings, and clothing. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICrIONARY
698 (1986). The invention at issue in this case was the application of adhesive to duck for
placement in shoes as waterproofing material. Sydeman, 32 App. D.C. at 364-67.
24. Sydeman, 32 App. D.C. at 365.
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third class, so its intended purpose must have been satisfactorily
performed under conditions in which it would actually be used." The
court held that the experiment was insufficient to show a reduction to
practice, noting that the tests conducted had produced unsatisfactory
results.26 Specifically, the test results demonstrated that the machine
applied the adhesive too slowly to yield the appropriate tackiness on the
cloth.27 Therefore, the invention failed to perform its intended
purpose.28 By failing to produce the desired adhesive surface on the
cloth, the invention had not been reduced to practice.29
This systematic approach of assigning inventions to certain classes
before determining the required level of testing slowly eroded. In its
place, the courts began to apply a less confining standard which turned
on the nature of the invention and the particular facts of the case.
Gellert v. Wanberg ° exemplified this shift. In Gellert, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals3 addressed the issue of whether a
demonstration of a modified disposable diaper constituted a reduction
to practice.32 The appellee's demonstration consisted of showing his
boss the reversible feature of the new diaper by reaching inside an
internal polyethylene pouch and pulling it inside-out so the diaper was
inside the bag formed by the reversed pouch.33 The court rejected
appellant's argument that this test lacked the necessary simulation or
actual in-use conditions meant for the invention, and held that the
demonstration adequately proved reduction to practice.34 In denying the
need to test the diaper in its intended setting, the Gellert court took
notice of the fact that the invention was only a modification of the
disposable diaper already in widespread use.35 In reaching its decision,
the court departed from Sydeman by enunciating a "common sense"
approach to determining the extent of testing required. 6

25. Id. at 374.
26. Id. at 374-75.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 495 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
31. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was merged with the Court of Claims by
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 25-26, 28, 36-39
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) to form the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 199; see also infra note 37
(explaining the purpose and role of the court).
32. Gellert, 495 F.2d at 781.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 781, 783-84.
35. Id. at 782 (citing findings of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences).
36. Id. at 784. The court noted" 'that a certain amount of common sense must be applied
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit37 then stemmed the
tide in Newkirk v. Lulejian.38 In Newkirk, an inventor asserted that a
working model of a robot capable of performing a stored program
change proved reduction to practice." The court disagreed, and held
that it was necessary for the test to actually show robot operation being
altered; merely showing that the means existed was insufficient.' This
conclusion was reached without reference to the "common sense"
language from Gellert. Instead, the court pursued a stricter approach by
flatly rejecting the notion that the theoretical capability of an invention's
intended purpose could suffice to establish reduction to practice." The
test must affirmatively show that the invention worked for its intended
purpose.4"
The instant court recognized the strict rule set forth in Newkirk
regarding actual demonstration of the invention performing its intended
function. However, the court did so only in passing," choosing
instead to apply a common sense approach by resurrecting Gellert.45
The court invoked Sydeman to justify its decision to ignore Newkirk and
to determine on its own the nature of testing necessary.46 According to
Sydeman, reasoned the instant court, the character of the testing varies
with the nature of the invention and the problem it proposes to solve.47
The ultimate decision as to the proper testing would be drawn by using

in determining the extent of testing required for a reduction to practice.' "Id. (quoting Neufeld
v. Marte, 254 F.2d 164, 167-68 (C.C.P.A. 1958)).
37. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to eliminate the
persistent disparities in patent law decisions among courts of appeals. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
3, at 199. This court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions in
patent cases and appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office's Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences involving patent applications and interferences. Id.
38. 825 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 1582.
40. Id. at 1583.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
44. Id. Indeed, the court viewed Newkirk as an example of the different approaches that
courts follow by noting, "[tiesting sufficient to show a reduction to practice has often been at
issue in interference proceedings." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1062. The court was apparently harkening back to the three classes enunciated
in Sydeman, see supra text accompanying notes 16-22, by referring to Sydeman while stating,
"the underlying principle that governs the nature of testing necessary to show reduction to
practice [isthat] the character of the testing varies with the character of the invention and the
problem it solves." Scott, 34 F.3d at 1062.
47. Scott, 34 F.3d at 1062.
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common sense as a guide. 4' Applying this rationale, the instant court
concluded that the level of testing would turn on the level of uncertainty
attending the problem to be solved: when the uncertainty was high,
precise testing in actual use or closely simulated conditions was
necessary,49 whereas little or no testing was needed when the uncertainty
was low.

The court decided the penile implant belonged in the low uncertainty
category." This finding was based on the prevailing and proven
successes of inflatable penile prostheses already in use." Because the
instant invention employed previously tested materials and differed only
in that the invention was self-contained and fully manipulable by the
user, the problem was deemed uncomplicated. 2 Therefore, the court
held that the prosthesis did not need to be tested under actual use
conditions. 3 A reasonable showing that the invention overcame the
problem it was intended to solve would suffice. 4 The court found the
videotape provided the reasonable showing.5
The instant court canvassed numerous prior decisions in forming its
opinion.56 In an apparent attempt to reconcile disparate approaches, the
court fashioned a synthesis resulting in a common sense approach to
determining the level of testing sufficient to prove reduction to
practice. 7 This approach in effect revived the classification analysis of
Sydeman58 with a slight adjustment-the number of classes was pared
from three to two. 59 Yet, substantively, the change was insignificant.
The first two Sydeman classes, comprised of inventions so simple that
testing was not required and those requiring testing only to the point

48. Id. at 1063.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court presented no proof to support this assertion, but instead simply
proclaimed that the prosthetic implant under review was related to other inflatable penile
prostheses that had been extensively tested. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court used three criteria to determine whether the invention succeeded in
solving the problem. Id. One was the novelty of the materials used. Id. This criterion was met
without relying on the videotape. Id. Because the materials were not new to the field of
prosthetics, the court accepted that they would be sufficiently durable. Id. The other two
criteria-rigidity for intercourse and operability of the valve to inflate and deflate the
device-were evaluated by observing the videotape. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1060-63. The court referenced no less than 30 cases. See id.
57. See id. at 1063; supra text accompanying note 48.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
59. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1063.
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where the intended purpose was reasonably satisfied, collapsed into the
second class defined in the instant case, namely, problems which have
little uncertainty.' The third Sydeman class, made up of inventions
requiring satisfactory execution of their intended purposes, corresponds
closely to the first class of the instant case, highly uncertain problems
requiring testing under actual use or closely simulated conditions. 1
The instant court still had to resolve the problem posed by Newkirk.
Newkirk identified but one class of inventions-those which required
testing to demonstrate they worked for their intended purposes. 2
Although this class paralleled the first class of the instant case, Newkirk
made no provision for another class corresponding to the second class
of the instant case. The instant court handled this dilemma by narrowly
classifying Newkirk as merely one approach of many.63 In essence, the
court believed Newkirk was solely concerned with the facts of its
case." Consequently, there was no need to discuss testing sufficiency
for other classes of inventions. Thus, Newkirk could simply be labeled
a "class one" case, possessed of little doctrinal weight.
The instant court did not, however, choose to view Gellert in a
similarly narrow fashion. Having blunted the force of Newkirk, the court
embraced Gellert for the broad proposition that common sense
undergirds the sufficiency of testing determinations.6 Given the
similarity of the circumstances attending Gellert and the instant case,6
it is not surprising the court followed Gellert. Both the diaper in Gellert
and the penile implant in the instant case represented modifications to
technologies already proven successful, rather than pioneering inventions
creating entirely new technologies. 7 Moreover, neither invention

60. Compare Sydeman, 32 App. D.C. at 373-74 (setting out first and second classes for
inventions) with Scott, 34 F.3d at 1061-62 (defining the court's second class). See supra notes
23-24, 49 and accompanying text.
61. Compare Sydeman, 32 App. D.C. at 374 (defining the third class) with Scott, 34 F.3d
at 1061-62 (defining the first class). See supra notes 28, 49 and accompanying text.
62. See Newkirk, 825 F.2d at 1583; supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
63. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1061-62; supra note 44. The court apparently viewed Newkirk
as a hard-line approach to be applied only when an invention is complicated. After briefly
mentioning Newkirk and two other cases which took similar views, the court discussed another
line of cases which held that some inventions can be so simple that their mere construction is
sufficient to show workability. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1061.
64. Scott, 34 F.3d at 1061.
65. Id.
66. Compare Gellert, 495 F.2d at 782 (finding that the diaper in question was primarily
based on existing designs that had been extensively tested) with Scott, 34 F.3d at 1063 (finding
that the technology used as the basis for the penile implant was neither novel nor extensively

tested).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 35, 52.
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introduced new materials which would have invited more scrupulous
testing to ensure that the inventions would still be compatible with their
intended environments." Thus, the penile implant, like the disposable
diaper, could be reduced to practice without demonstrating its
performance in actual use conditions. 69 An abstract demonstration
exhibiting the range of the implant's functions would suffice."
Despite these plain similarities in the character of the inventions, the
instant court avoided analyzing the case along this direct line of
reasoning, opting to arrive at the same result by following the more
circuitous path posed by its common sense assessment. The court
may have had two concerns in mind in electing to analyze the case the
way it did. First, the court may have avoided an analogous case
approach due to the disparate levels of sophistication of the two
inventions. The complexity of the penile implant-a valve-operated,
dual-reservoir, surgically implanted prosthesis-far exceeded that of the
modified disposable diaper.
Equally as significant was the difference in the complexity of the
problems to be solved. If the court had relied on an analogous case
approach, it would have had difficulty justifying similar levels of testing
for the two inventions, given that the two classifications the court
recognized were distinguished by the uncertainty of the problem to be
solved.7 2 Particularly, the court would have been hard-pressed to
maintain that the likelihood of unforeseen problems arising in operation
of the penile prosthesis during sexual intercourse was no greater than
problems which might arise when a baby soils a diaper. 3 In essence,
the court's common sense/problem-uncertainty analysis would have
dictated an outcome the court did not want-testing of the prosthesis
under actual use conditions as warranted by class one.
The second reason the court may have adopted a common sense
approach was to avoid closer scrutiny of the invention itself and the
problem it was designed to solve. The sweeping gloss of a common

68. See supra text accompanying notes 35, 52.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 53.
70. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1063; supra note 54 and accompanying text.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
72. See supra text accompanying note 49.
73. One important design element of the invention that could not have been tested by the
surgeon's demonstration was the effect of pressure on the forward reservoirs. EMIL A. TANAGHO
ET AL., CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF IMPOTENCE AND INFERTILITY 195 (1988). Two
scenarios are possible. Id. The most dangerous one would occur if a reservoir ruptured. Scott,
34 F.3d at 1060. Another possibility is that the fluid in the reservoirs would apply enough
pressure against the valve that the valve may inadvertently open, resulting in loss of erection.
TANAGHO, supra, at 195.
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sense analysis permitted the court to sidestep a potentially
uncomfortable discussion on sexuality.74 The court's aversion for this
subject matter may have been most clearly illustrated by the narrow way
it framed the problem the prosthesis was designed to solve." By
defining the problem as simulating an erection for sexual intercourse, 6
the court ignored the obvious purpose of the invention-namely, the
ability of the implant to permit satisfactory sexual intercourse.77
Whether the invention was reduced to practice under this
characterization would have been impossible to answer without testing
under actual conditions. Only such a test would.permit performance to
be evaluated vis-h-vis intended purpose by enabling observation of
function and, perhaps more importantly, critique by the subjects of the
test.78 But the court shied away from scrutinizing the problem the
invention purported to solve to such a degree, and in the process
relieved itself of the responsibility of taking a hard look at whether
reduction to practice had occurred. 7 From this perspective, the court's
reliance on Gellert may not have rested strictly on an attraction for the
hardly groundbreaking notion of common sense.
In hiding behind the sterile cloak of common sense, the court
74. The Gellert court likewise shunned actual testing, which might have been unpleasant,
by invoking a common sense rationale. See Gellert, 495 F.2d at 784. The appellant advanced
a plausible argument: the integral pouch of the disposable diaper might be damaged by the
crushing and twisting of the diaper while worn by an infant. Id. at 781. The court, however,
summarily dismissed this argument, agreeing with the Board's subjective conclusion that the
reversible pouch would not be rendered inoperable. Id. at 782.
75. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1059-60, 1063.
76. Id. at 1059.
77. Had the instant court defined the problem in this broader context, it would have
paralleled the reasoning in Sydeman. In Sydeman, the court observed that the machine did in fact
dispense an adhesive onto the cloth, but "[tihe thing to be attained was the construction of a
machine, after passing through which the material would emerge in a pliable and 'tacky'
condition, and sufficiently dry so that it could be rapidly cut and applied and passed to the
pressing machine." Sydeman, 32 App. D.C. at 371. The machine worked too slowly to be
successful. Id. Therefore, although the machine could operate, it was never reduced to practice
because it could not satisfactorily solve the problem for which it was designed. Id. This outcome
could not have been reached without framing the problem in a broad context and then
conducting a test under actual or closely simulated conditions.
78. The Sydeman court had the intended beneficiaries of the invention in mind. See id. at
367. After defining what would be satisfactory performance by the machine, the court
commented: "This alone would meet the demand of the shoe manufacturers." Id.
79, See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1063. The court thus felt the Food and Drug Administration (the
FDA) was the proper agency for testing the safety and effectiveness of the prosthetic device. Id.
The court erred by absolving itself of the responsibility to test effectiveness as well as safety.
Human safety issues rightly fall to the FDA, but that does not relieve the Patent and Trademark
Office and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of their duty to review effectiveness. See
In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 476 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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avoided applying principled legal analysis to the question of whether a
videotape showing the manipulation of a penile prosthesis on an
anesthetized man constituted a reduction to practice when the intended
purpose of the prosthesis was to simulate an erection for sexual
intercourse."0 However, the court blushed itself into a comer. With
common sense as the basis for deriving an approach founded on
scrutinizing the problem the invention was designed to solve, the court
then refused to give more than a cursory glance to the intended purpose
of the invention."1 Understandably, the extraordinary diversity of
contested patents makes determinations of reduction to practice an
especially inexact science. This fact should not, however, permit courts
to tailor decisions without appropriate judicial scrutiny. The instant court
acted in such a manner, leaving in doubt what type of reasoning
potential litigants might face. If the court has told us anything, it is that
common sense keeps sex and dirty diapers out of the courtroom.

80. See supra text accompanying note 65.
81. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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